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Abstract. The objective of the present work consists in testing whether the strategic in-
volvement of boards of directors has a positive influence on the development of alliance 
portfolio management capability and on the value that the alliance portfolio generates. 
A variance-based structural equation modelling (Partial Least Squares) has been applied 
to a sample constituted by 139 top Spanish companies. Our analysis shows that the stra-
tegic involvement of the board of directors has a positive and influence on the manage-
ment of alliance portfolios, thereby influencing the value of that portfolio in an indirect 
way. Unlike previous literature, this study links the functions of the board of directors 
to organizational capabilities, connecting the literature on corporate governance and on 
management of alliance portfolios.
Keywords: alliance portfolio management capability, alliance portfolio value, board com-
position, corporate governance, multiple mediating model, partial least squares, strategic 
implications of boards of directors.
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Introduction
Strategic alliances have become a valuable strategic tool for firm competitiveness 
(Schilke, Goerzen 2010), because they constitute an appropriate mechanism to redress 
certain shortages of resources (Hoffmann 2005) in increasingly competitive business 
environments that fluctuate sharply. These alliances have generally been studied in the 
literature from an atomistic perspective (dyadic ties) (Granovetter 1992; Schreiner et al. 
2009). In practice, nevertheless, firms involve themselves in simultaneous strategic alli-
ances with multiple partners establishing important interorganizational networks. It has 
been pointed out, over recent years, that firms should be capable of strategic manage-
ment of all these network resources, stimulating their mobilization and enabling access 
to them, thereby applying a holistic approach to the management of their alliance port-
folios (Wassmer, Dussauge 2012).
Alliance portfolio management requires the development of a specific organizational 
capability. So, alliance portfolio management capability may be defined as the capabil-
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ity of a firm to develop alliance portfolio strategies, to establish a management system 
and to coordinate and to control the portfolio as a whole, facilitating the combination 
and the transfer of resources between actors (Hoffmann 2005).
There is little or no literature on the possible factors and variables that could influence 
the development and the execution of this capability to manage alliance portfolios. As 
this is a strategic capability, Hoffmann (2005) pointed out that the board of directors 
needs to involve itself in central alliance portfolio management and should assume a 
particular role and position. In a broader sense along these same lines, some researchers 
propose that there is a need to analyse alliance portfolios from the perspective of corpo-
rate governance (Reuer, Ragozzino 2006; Wassmer 2010). Thus, numerous examples of 
alliance portfolios constitute a mixture of strategic alliances with little coordination and 
conflicting demands. Corporate governance might perhaps be able to provide explana-
tions for these disparities in the results.
In short, some authors (McNulty, Pettigrew 1999) have identified a gap in the literature, 
as on the one hand, it is recommended that boards of directors should involve them-
selves more in strategy, although, on the other hand, there are few empirical studies that 
analyse this role, and none that relate to strategic management of their alliance port-
folios. Therefore, it is our intention to explore the following central question: Will the 
strategic involvement of a board of directors influence alliance portfolio value through 
the dimensions of its alliance portfolio management capability? In order to achieve this 
objective, our investigation analyses the influence of the board of directors on alliance 
portfolio management, conducting an in-depth study of this capability that has only 
recently been construed, either as a set of independent dimensions (Sarkar et al. 2009; 
Schreiner et al. 2009), or as a single construct (Schilke, Goerzen 2010). With this aim 
in mind, this paper proposes a multiple mediation model (Hayes et al. 2011), in order 
to investigate the mediating role of the dimensions of alliance portfolio management 
capability on the relationship between the strategic implication of boards of directors 
and alliance portfolio value.
In conclusion, this work makes a theoretical and a practical contribution. The main 
theoretical contribution of this investigative study is to analyse the role that the boards 
of directors might have, centring on the management of alliance portfolios. At an em-
pirical level, the study shows that the strategic involvement of the board of directors has 
a positive and significative influence on the different organizational processes linked to 
the management of alliance portfolios, thereby influencing the value of that portfolio 
in an indirect way.
1. Theoretical background
1.1. Alliance portfolio management capability and alliance portfolio value
Alliance portfolio management capability may be defined as an adeptness at identifying 
partners, the initiation of strategic alliances, the participation of the firm in continu-
ous management, and the possible restructuring and even completion of such alliances 
(Khanna et al. 1998). Accordingly, this capability requires a series of organizational 
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processes or dimensions. Sarkar et al. (2009) identifies three dimensions. Firstly, a pro-
active dimension that aims to span the organizational routines that are followed to 
constitute the alliance portfolio (partnering proactiveness) (Tang 2011). Secondly, a 
relational dimension that gathers together the focal actor’s skills to develop coopera-
tive models that are characterized by mutual trust and the minimization of opportunistic 
behaviours (relational governance) (Sepulveda, Gabrielsson 2013). The third and final 
process is an integration dimension, which aims to cover knowledge transfer processes 
and other types of resources through the different channels that form the focal actor’s 
portfolio (portfolio coordination) (Lahiri, Narayanan 2013).
An important question resides in how to evaluate and to determine the value of an al-
liance portfolio, as that value is more than the simple sum of the individual alliances 
and the value that each one generates. Optimum management, therefore, of a portfolio 
should generate synergies, economies of scale and scope, and positive spillovers for 
the focal actor (Sarkar et al. 2009). In this sense, Hoffmann (2005) pointed to a need 
for two types of factors in any assessment of an alliance portfolio. The output factors 
refer to financial performance factors (profit, cashflow), as well as to the achievement 
of strategic aims (market share) (Sarkar et al. 2009; Schilke, Goerzen 2010). The input 
factors are centred on the quantity and quality of the resources supplied by the partners 
in the portfolio. This also covers such questions as the quality of their relationships 
(Hoffmann 2005). On this point, Sarkar et al. (2009) developed the concept of alliance 
portfolio capital as a critical source of competitive advantage, consisting of an aggregate 
of interorganizational resources that are linked to a focal actor through its participation 
in a set of alliances.
1.2. Boards of directors and alliance portfolios
The literature on corporate governance has fundamentally centred on the control func-
tion based on agency theory. In this area, researchers have studied the way in which 
strategic decisions taken in the context of fusions, take-overs and corporate diversifica-
tion are affected by agency problems. Some authors consider that this whole current 
of research should be applied analogously to alliance portfolio management (Reuer, 
Ragozzino 2006; Wassmer 2010).
The literature points to another important responsibility of the board of directors, which 
is the service/collaboration function (He et al. 2010). Stewardship theory challenges the 
logic that is upheld by agency theory, arguing that the interests of managers and board 
members do not necessarily collide (Muth, Donaldson 1998). From this perspective, the 
role of the board is to assess and to participate in the strategic decisions of the firm. Ac-
cordingly, Huse and Zattoni (2008) proposed that a continuum may be observed which 
would reveal the varying degrees of commitment and task involvement of the board of 
directors. At one end of the spectrum, the passive board of directors would be found, 
which gathers no information from the firm and simply rubber stamps all executive 
decisions; and, at the other end, is the board of directors, which actively participates 
and is involved in the decisions of the firm. In this work, understanding that control 
and service functions are closely related and should be developed and analysed at the 
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same time (Roberts et al. 2005), we are going to study how the involvement strategy 
of these boards of directors in their management of the alliance portfolio impacts on 
the value of the alliance portfolio through the dimensions that constitute the alliance 
portfolio management capability.
2. Hypotheses
2.1. The relationship between the strategic involvement  
of boards of directors and the alliance portfolio value
Various studies have described the relation between corporate governance and organiza-
tional performance in the literature (Heracleous 2001). So, Zahra and Pearce II (1989) 
point out that the impact of the boards of directors on the performance of the firm can 
occur, on the one hand, through the attributes of the board and, on the other hand, 
through the functions that it performs. In relation to the roles or functions performed 
by the board of directors, some researchers have pointed out that the active participa-
tion of directors in the strategic decisions will impact directly on any improvement in 
firm performance (Ruigrok et al. 2006). This would imply, in our work, that the mere 
participation of the directors in the strategic discussions of the firm will increase its 
alliance portfolio value. In accordance with these ideas:
H1: The strategic involvement of the board of directors is positively related to the value 
of the alliance portfolio.
2.2. The mediating role of the partnering proactiveness
The partnering proactiveness dimension was defined by Sarkar et al. (2009) as the capa-
bility of the firm to discover to new alliance opportunities ahead of its competitors and 
to respond to them. These strategic decisions entail agency hazards such as the selection 
of an alter and the establishment of an alliance could be motivated by an opportunity 
for the managers, in terms of increased status or prestige that could turn into external 
employment opportunities (Reuer, Ragozzino 2006), rather than by a real opportunity to 
increase the value of the firm and, therefore, to favour the interests of firm owners. Ac-
cordingly, the active involvement of the boardroom directors in the strategic decisions 
of their firms forces the managers to analyse the proposals in greater depth, before mak-
ing their decisions, which could optimize the choice of an alter (Ruigrok et al. 2006). 
In addition, the knowledge, the capabilities and the relations of the boards of directors 
could facilitate the identification of new openings for alliances (Wincent et al. 2010). 
In this sense, directors with a high number of valuable external relations may facilitate 
the identification of and the response to alliance opportunities (Kor, Sundaramurthy 
2009). For these reasons, it is proposed that the involvement of the boards of directors 
in strategic decision will impact on partnering proactiveness.
Likewise, Sarkar et al. (2009) established that the partnering proactiveness dimension 
would positively influence the value of the focal actor’s alliance portfolio; an advantage 
of the benefits of first-movers as much as the optimum selection of partners and the 
development of relational patterns that benefit the focal actor (Oerlemans et al. 2013). 
In accordance with these ideas:
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H2: The relationship between the strategic involvement of the board of directors and 
alliance portfolio value is positively mediated by partnering proactiveness.
2.3. The mediating role of relational governance
The role of relational governance in the portfolio refers to the capability of the focal 
actor to develop informal self-enforcing safeguards in the relationships that constitute 
the portfolio in which the partners’ opportunistic behaviour is minimized. In this way, 
the directors could be more concerned about portfolio growth and the expansion of the 
interorganizational network with a view to signalling their own capabilities, rather than 
strengthening existing ties (Reuer, Ragozzino 2006). So, the strategic involvement of 
the board of directors in relational governance of the alliance portfolio, through the 
contribution of knowledge, capabilities and relations (interlocking directorates), could 
strengthen the ties that constitute the alliance portfolio, minimizing the opportunistic 
behaviour of the alters, as well as complementing governance mechanisms of a formal 
nature with other more informal ones based on trust (Kor, Sundaramurthy 2009; Ruig-
rok et al. 2006; Simoni, Caiazza 2012).
Likewise, Sarkar et al. (2009) noted that the relational governance dimension is associ-
ated with alliance portfolio value. Accordingly, these researchers established that the 
better the relational quality of the focal actor with strategic partners which make up 
the portfolio, the greater the value of the alliance portfolio. We therefore hypothesize 
as follows:
H3: The relationship between the strategic involvement of the board of directors and 
alliance portfolio value is positively mediated by relational governance.
2.4. The mediating role of the portfolio coordination
The main objective of the dimension portfolio coordination is to manage the multiple 
relationships and their interdependences, with the objective of transforming the focal 
actor’s portfolio into a coherent set of interorganizational strategic resources (Sarkar 
et al. 2009). Reuer and Ragozzino (2006) proposed that managers might feel a greater 
incentivize to signal their own capabilities as directors to a particular partner, looking 
for individual employment opportunities rather than seeking advantages for the afore-
mentioned portfolio. In addition, the overall view of the firm held by the board of direc-
tors, and the debates that these directors will have in the adoption of strategic decisions, 
will allow the identification of opportunities in terms of coordination and mobilization 
of the resources of the alters (Ruigrok et al. 2006). The strategic involvement of the 
board of directors in the coordination of the portfolio could guarantee more effective 
and efficient holistic management of portfolio flows in such a way as to achieve col-
laborative synergies, economies of scale and scope, positive spillovers and, to avoid 
negative conflicts.
Likewise, some authors pointed out that the portfolio coordination dimension is related 
with alliance portfolio value (Sarkar et al. 2009; Schilke, Goerzen 2010). Accordingly, 
it would be logical to imagine that the coordination and mobilization of valuable net-
work resources (Casanueva et al. 2014; Sluyts et al. 2011) will raise the likelihood of 
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an increase in alliance portfolio value. Based on this logic and on previous research, 
we hypothesize as follows:
H4: The relationship between the strategic involvement of the board of directors and 
alliance portfolio value is positively mediated by portfolio coordination.
3. Research methodology
3.1. Sample
The primary data required to test our hypothesis was gathered from guided or supervised 
questionnaires administered by interviewers. We created a list of 500 firms among the 
top Spanish companies listed on the INFORMA D&B and SABI databases. Initial con-
tact with the firms on the list was by telephone. A total of 199 expressed a willingness 
to collaborate and an appointment was arranged to work through the guided question-
naire, which was administered by a team of surveyors. Of the almost 200 firms, 61 were 
removed when incompliance with the established requirements was noted. Our final 
sample was therefore 139 large Spanish firms, which presented the following average 
data for 2011: turnover of €214,077,501, a workforce of 427 employees and an average 
age of 27.27.
These firms were requested to have, on the one hand, a director respond to the ques-
tions relating to the characteristics and operation of the board of directors and, on the 
other hand, that a manager attached to the alliance function respond to the questions 
on alliance portfolio management. In relation to this latter part, with the objective of 
maximizing data accuracy and reliability, given that the information was obtained from 
a single informant, we analysed halo effects following the procedure described by Liang 
et al. (2007). So, a new factor called “method” was introduced in the research model. 
This method factor included all the principal indicators of the construct. In this way, the 
variance of each indicator was explained for both the principal construct and the factor 
method. Our results show an average substantively explained variance of the indicators 
of .684 and an average method-based variance of .010. The ratio of substantive variance 
to method variance is about 68.4:1. In addition, none of the method factor loadings are 
significant. Therefore, the common method bias is unlikely to cause serious concern in 
this study.
3.2. Measures
Table 1 shows individual items and their loadings on relevant constructs, so as to un-
derstand the measurements of the dependent, the independent and the control variables 
more clearly. All measurements items, except certain variables (company size, board 
size, board composition, board rotation and CEO duality), were assessed on a 7-point 
Likert Scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
3.2.1. Dependent variable: the alliance portfolio value 
Hoffman (2005) showed that two types of factors can be used to calculate the value of 
an alliance portfolio: output and input. Along these lines, output factors aim to gather 
the portfolio’s performance. To achieve this objective some authors (Schilke, Goerzen 
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2010) consider that this approach is appropriate, if the respondents represent top-level 
management and express their satisfaction with the performance of the portfolio. There-
fore, the alliance portfolio was measured in terms of performance satisfaction. We used 
a four-item scale that was developed based on Schilke and Goerzen (2010). The four 
indicators loaded onto one factor. We used the factor scores as a composite measure 
for the alliance portfolio performance (Managers assess performance in terms of their 
overall satisfaction with the alliance, or in terms of the extent to which an alliance has 
met its stated objectives). Managerial assessments of alliance performance received 
some initial criticism for reasons of bias and inaccuracy. This was especially true until 
research by Geringer and Hebert (1991) demonstrated the existence of a high correlation 
between subjective assessments of performance with more objective measures, based 
on accounting data. Thus, there is an emerging consensus among scholars that, if prop-
erly done, managerial assessments are a reasonable way to assess alliance performance 
(Das, Teng 2000). On the other hand, input factors reflect the quantity and quality of the 
resources which the partners that make up the portfolio supply. The alliance portfolio 
capital was measured with a three-item scale that was developed based on Sarkar et al. 
(2009). With these three indicators we did a principal components factor analysis with 
varimax rotation to develop a composite measure. The three indicators were loaded 
onto one factor and we then used the factor scores as a composite measure for alliance 
portfolio capital. Finally, we used the factor scores as a composite measure for Alliance 
portfolio value (APV).
3.2.2. Independent variables: the strategic involvement of the boards of directors 
and the dimensions of alliance portfolio management capability 
The data on the board’s involvement in strategic decision-making were extracted from 
our sample. The Strategic involvement of the board of directors (SIBD) variable was 
modelled according to a composite latent construct model. Measurement of this con-
struct involved five reflective indicators. So, the directors were asked to rate board 
involvement on a seven-point Likert scale for each of the five features of the strategic 
decision-making process (Ruigrok et al. 2006).
The dimensions of alliance portfolio management capability (Partnering proactiveness 
(P_PRO), Relational governance (R_GOV) and Portfolio coordination (P_COOR)) 
were measured with a five-item Likert scale which was adapted from the literature 
(Sarkar et al. 2009; Schilke, Goerzen 2010).
3.2.3. Control variable: the size of the firm,  
alliance experience and alliance function 
We controlled for company size as the logarithm of the number of employees and for 
alliance experience and alliance function which was measured on a seven-point Likert 
scale (Sarkar et al. 2009). Accordingly, large firms with extensive experience in alli-
ances and with a dedicated alliance function may have greater capabilities to assign 
resources and to exploit knowledge for the development of alliance portfolio manage-
ment routines (Ruigrok et al. 2006; Vandaie, Zaheer 2014).
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3.2.4. Explicative variables (antecedents) of strategic involvement: board size, 
board composition, board directors rotation and CEO duality 
Our analysis includes a series of antecedent variables of the strategic involvement of 
the board of directors that have been described in the literature (Pearce II, Zahra 1992). 
Board size was operationalized as the total number of directors on the board. Board 
composition was operationalized as the proportion of outsider directors to total board 
size. Besides, Ruigrok et al. (2006) highlighted CEO Duality as an important anteced-
ent variable of the strategic involvement of the board (1 if the CEO and was the same 
person as the director of the board and 0 if otherwise). Finally, rotation was used as 
a proxy of board expertise (Zahra, Pearce II 1990) which was measured as a dichoto-
mous variable (1 if changes had occurred over the last three years in the council and 0 
if otherwise).
3.3. Data analysis and results
3.3.1. Data analysis
Tests on the research model, with the assistance of Smart PLS 2.0. M3 software (Ringle 
et al. 2005) were applied Partial Least Squares (PLS), a variance-based structural equa-
tion modelling technique (Henseler et al. 2009).
PLS is primarily intended for causal-predictive analysis, in which the problems ex-
plored are complex and prior theoretical knowledge is scarce. Consequently, PLS is an 
appropriate technique to use in a theory-development situation that is the case of this 
study. PLS has also been chosen because this contribution focuses on the prediction of 
dependent variables. The use of PLS with regard to covariance-based structural equation 
modelling (maximum-likelihood) is also recommended due the sample size (n = 139) 
(Castro, Roldán 2013).
3.3.2. Measurement model
The evaluation of the reflective measurement models examines its reliability and valid-
ity (Henseler et al. 2009). First, all standardized loadings (λ) exceeded the 0.707 level 
(Table 1), except for one item from the relational governance dimension, but as this 
construct complied with the two conditions that are analysed further on, we decided to 
maintain it. Therefore, individual item reliability was acceptable. Second, the five latent 
variables met the requirement of construct reliability, as their composite reliabilities (ρc) 
were greater than 0.7 (Table 1). Such constructs achieve convergent validity, because 
their average variance extracted (AVE) measures exceed the level of 0.5 (Table 1). Fi-
nally, all latent variables achieved discriminant validity. This is calculated by a compari-
son of the square root of the AVE with the correlations between the constructs (Table 2).
3.3.3. Structural model
As Henseler et al. (2009) note, the use of bootstrapping (5000 resamples) generates 
standard errors and t-statistics to evaluate the statistical significance of the path coef-
ficients. Simultaneously, calculation of the bootstrapping confidence intervals of stand-
ardized regression coefficients forms part of the analysis. As shown in Figure 1B, six 
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of seven direct effects are significant. This outcome is also achieved observing the 
percentile bootstrap 95% confidence interval. From the analysis of these results, we 
can conclude that H1 is not supported. The direct effect of the strategic implication 
of the boards of directors on the alliance portfolio value (c’) is not significant and its 
confidence interval includes zero. The results summarized in Table 3 confirm that the 
predictive relevance of the structural model is satisfactory for alliance portfolio value 
(Q2 = 0.420).
In order to test the mediation hypotheses (H2–H4), we have applied the analytical ap-
proach described by Hayes et al. (2011). Figure 1A describes the total effects of the 
strategic implication of the boards of directors (c) on the alliance portfolio value. Figure 
1B expresses the total effect of the strategic implication of the boards of directors on the 
alliance portfolio value as the sum of the direct (c’) and indirect effect (a1b1 + a2b2 + 
a3b3). Thus, c = c’ + a1b1 + a2b2 + a3b3, where c’ is the direct effect of the strategic 
implication of the boards of directors on the alliance portfolio value (H1), controlling 
for three mediators (partnering proactiveness, relational governance and portfolio coor-
dination). This method has the advantage of being able to isolate the indirect effect of 
mediating variables, that is, the partnering proactiveness (H1: a1b1), relational govern-
ance (H2: a2b2) and the portfolio coordination (H3: a3b3).
The application of bootstrapping allowed us to test the mediation hypotheses (Hayes 
et al. 2011). This study’s 5000 resamples generated 95% confidence intervals (percen-
tile) for the mediators.









STRATEGIC IMPLICATION (reflective construct: 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7))
0.938 0.753
The board of directors has exercised its authority and has 
involved itself in …
making suggestions that, frequently, improve strategic 
decisions
0.847
making proposals on long-term strategies and the main 
goals
0.868
making decisions on long-term strategies and the main 
goals
0.917
putting decisions on long-term strategies and main goals 
into action. 
0.844
monitoring the follow up of decisions on long-term 













PARTNERING PROACTIVENESS (reflective construct: 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7))
.920 .699
We actively monitor our environment to identify 
partnering opportunities
0.848
We routinely gather information about prospective partners 
from various forums
0.781
We are alert to market developments that create potential 
alliance opportunities
0.885
We strive to preempt our competition by entering into 
alliances with key firms before they can do so
0.847
We often take the initiative in approaching firms with 
alliance proposals
0.815
RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE (reflective construct: 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7))
0.830 0.555
Staying together during adversity/challenge is very 
important in our relationships
0.573
We endeavour to build relationships based on mutual trust 
and commitment
0.797
We strive to be flexible and accommodate partners when 
problems/needs arise
0.838
When disagreements arise in our alliances, we usually 
reassess facts in an attempt to reach a mutually 
satisfactory compromise
0.743
PORTFOLIO COORDINATION (reflective construct: 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7))
.923 .707
We consider our alliances as a portfolio that requires 
overall coordination, and not as independent, one-off 
arrangements
0.826
Our activities across different alliances are well 
coordinated
0.889
We systematically coordinate our strategies across different 
alliances
0.915
We have processes for the systematic transfer of 
knowledge between alliance partners
0.778
Managers from different departments meet periodically to 
examine how we can create synergies across our alliances
0.787
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO VALUE (aggregate 
multidimensional construct)
.926 .646
Continue of Table 1
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Alliance portfolio capital (strongly disagree (1) to strongly 
agree (7)):
Your organization’s reputation in the market as a “partner 
of choice”
0.658
The competitive strength of your alliance network 0.739
Strength of the relationships with alliance partners 0.828
Alliance portfolio performance (strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (7)):
Overall, we are satisfied with the performance of our 
alliances
0.895
Generally, our alliances satisfy our initial objectives 0.855
Overall we are satisfied with the knowledge accumulated 
from participating in alliances
0.881
Our alliances have been profitable investments 0.739
SIZE
Number of employees 1 1 1
ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE (strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7))
Your organization’s experience in managing alliances compared 
to your competitors 1 1 1
ALLIANCE FUNCTION (strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7))
Your firm has a dedicated department that is dedicated to 
overseeing its alliance portfolio 1 1 1
BOARD SIZE
The number of directors sitting on the board of an individual 
company 1 1 1
BOARD COMPOSITION
Outsider directors divided by board size 1 1 1
BOARD ROTATION
Number of directors that changed in the last three years 1 1 1
CEO DUALITY
CEO and the chairman of the board are the same individual 1 1 1
End of Table 1
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Table 3. Effects on endogenous variables




(R2 = 0.06 / Q2 = 0.036)
SIBD (a1) 0.227** 2.47 [0.057 ; 0.414] Sig 5.26%
Relational governance
(R2 = 0.13 / Q2 = 0.074)
SIBD (a2) 0.365*** 4.181 [0.190 ; 0.535] Sig 13.24%
Portfolio coordination
(R2 = 0.13 / Q2 = 0.095)
SIBD (a3) 0.370*** 4.823 [0.224 ; 0.528] Sig 13.68%
Alliance portfolio value
(R2 = 0.64 / Q2 = 0.420)
P_PRO (b1) 0.237** 2.483 [0.019 ; 0.407] Sig 15.98%
R_GOV (b2) 0.155* 2.075 [0.009 ; 0.310] Sig 8.39%
P_COOR (b3) 0.453*** 5.313 [0.285 ; 0.619] Sig 33.83%
H1: SIBD (c’) 0.0104ns 0.151 [–0.108 ; 0.155] NSig 0.25%
S 0.034 ns 0.70 [–0.070 ; 0.118] NSig 0.10%
EX 0.124 ns 1.613 [–0.036 ; 0.266] NSig 5.97%
AF 0.010 ns 0.188 [–0.095 ; 0.111] NSig 0.26%
Notes: SIBD: strategic implication board of directors; P_PRO: partnering proactiveness; R_GOV: rela-
tional governance; P_COOR: portfolio coordination; APV: alliance portfolio value; S: size; EX: experience 
portfolio. AF: alliance function. BS: board size. BC: board composition. ROT: rotation. DUAL: duality.
Sig. denotes a significant direct effect at 0.05; bootstrapping based on n = 5.000 subsamples; ***p < 
0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ns: not significant (based on t(4999), one-tailed test); t(0.05, 4999) = 
1.65, t(0.01, 4999) = 2.33, t(0.001, 4999) = 3.09.
Fig. 1. Structural models results
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4. Findings and discussion
Table 4 shows the results of the tests on the mediating effects of the variables. The 
SIBD had a significant total effect on APV (c = 0.252, t-value = 2.703) (Fig. 1A). When 
the mediators were introduced, the strategic involvement of the boards of directors 
no longer had a significant direct effect on alliance portfolio value (H1: c’ = 0.010, t-
value = 0.151). This means that P_PRO, R_GOV, P_COOR fully mediated the influence 
of the strategic involvement of boards of directors on alliance portfolio value. Indeed, 
as previously mentioned, H1 was not supported. However, no CIs contained zero, so 
the indirect effects were significant. Consequently, support is found for H2–H4, which 
means that the three indirect effects of SIBD on APV in our research model were sig-
nificant (Fig. 1B). Finally, the results show that the SIBD had a total indirect effect on 
APV (point estimate = 0.278), which was higher than its direct effect (point estimate = 
0.010).
In relation to the control variables included in our model, size and alliance function 
presented a negligible and non-significant paths and alliance experience presented a sig-
nificant path. Meanwhile, experience with alliances affected the relation between SIBD 
on APV in both a positive and significant manner (Fig. 1A). However, the influence 
of that experience on the capability that the organization has been able to develop was 
reduced, when alliance portfolio management capabilities were introduced as mediating 
dimensions. This finding highlights the importance of using knowledge acquired over 
time in the management of alliances, to develop organizational skills and capabilities 
that improve the performance of the portfolio.
Related to the antecedents of the SIBD, Table 4 shows that the size of the board of 
directors, its composition and CEO duality affected the SIBD in a positive and sig-
nificant way. On the contrary, the rotation of these boards of directors had a negative 
and significant impact on that involvement. So, Pearce II and Zahra (1992) pointed out 
that board composition, including the size and types and characteristics of board mem-
bership, will impact on the capability to provide strategic direction and performance. 
Thus, as the authors have pointed out, the literature has provided sufficient evidence 
that the capability of the boards of directors to fulfil their responsibilities, with regard 
to service, strategy and control, depends on their composition. Along these lines, it is 
noted that larger boards of directors make more significant contributions to strategy. In 
relation to CEO duality, the results obtained in the literature are divergent and many 
of them show an absence of correlation and significant meaning (Ruigrok et al. 2006; 
Zahra, Pearce II 1990). In this sense, the results obtained in our work appear to sup-
port the stewardship theory (Muth, Donaldson 1998), showing that clear leadership that 
arises from CEO duality is very valuable when the situation requires fast decisions and 
clear strategic orientation (Ruigrok et al. 2006). Thus, the firms that are increasingly 
involved in a larger number of alliances require a clear holistic, strategic focus to obtain 
their maximum performance, which may be helped by CEO duality. Finally, Zahra and 
Pearce II (1990) pointed out that the experience of the directors defined, among other 
factors by their familiarity with the operations of the company, is positively related to 
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the level of strategic involvement of the board. So, the existence of frequent changes 
in the directors that constitute the board will be detrimental to board expertise. Accord-
ingly, the results show that changes in the board of directors impacts on the SIBD in a 
negative and significant way.
With a view to studying the relations between the SIBD and alliance portfolio man-
agement, we proposed a model where macro-forces, based on theoretical approaches 
of corporate governance, interact with micro dynamics that attempt to encompass or-
ganizational processes and dimensions and which require the strategic management of 
alliance portfolios (Wassmer 2010). The model was analysed with data from 139 large 
Spanish firms and its hypotheses were tested through the application of a statistical 
mediation analysis.
Table 4. Summary of mediating effect tests
Total effect on APV Direct effects on APV Indirect effects on APV












0.278 0.17 0.404 Sig.
H2 = a1b1  
(via P_PRO)
0.054 0.003 0.129 Sig.
H3 = a2b2  
(via R_GOV) 
0.056 0.003 0.127 Sig.
H4 = a3b3  
(via P_COOR)
0.167 0.087 0.276 Sig.
S –0.05ns 0.751 S 0.034ns 0.70
EX 0.450*** 4.318 EXP 0.124 * 1.671
AF 0.110* 1.754 AF 0.010 ns 0.188
BS 0.290*** 3.639 BS 0.289*** 3.84
BC 0.239** 2.771 BC 0.236** 2.80
ROT –0.146* 2.013 ROT –0.141* 1.87
DUAL 0.180* 2.112 DUAL 0.178* 2.11
Notes: SIBD: strategic implication board of directors; P_PRO: partnering proactiveness; R_GOV: 
relational governance; P_COOR: portfolio coordination; APV: alliance portfolio value; S: Size; EX: 
experience portfolio. AF: alliance function. BS: board size. BC: board composition. ROT: rotation. 
DUAL: duality. Sig. denotes a significant direct effect at 0.05; bootstrapping based on n = 5.000 sub-
samples; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ns: not significant (based on t(4999), one-tailed test); 
t(0.05, 4999) = 1.65, t(0.01, 4999) = 2.33, t(0.001, 4999) = 3.09. Nsig. denotes a nonsignificant direct 
effect at 0.05.
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The results showed that P_PRO, R_GOV, P_COOR fully mediated the effect of the 
strategic involvement of boards of directors on alliance portfolio value. The results 
therefore support the three hypotheses of the study: P_PRO (H2), R_GOV (H3), and 
P_COOR (H4). Accordingly, the three dimensions identified by Sarkar et al. (2009) pre-
sented a positive and significative relation with the APV. In fact, the P_COOR dimen-
sion represented the best predictor of the APV, as it explained 33.83% of its variance. 
Thus, these results support the extrapolation or generalization of the findings of these 
researchers in a different empirical context. On the contrary, the direct relation between 
the SIBD and APV (H1) was not significative. Our results contribute to the literature, 
insofar as these relations had not been analysed beforehand (Reuer, Ragozzino 2006). 
Thus, on the one hand, the results appear to support the ideas of those authors that call 
for greater participation of the boards of directors in the strategies (Ruigrok et al. 2006). 
The results for the model with the total effect (Fig. 1A) indicated that the SIBD had a 
significant total effect on APV. However, the importance of the direct effect of the SIBD 
on APV almost entirely disappeared when we analyzed the full model (Fig. 1B). Thus, 
the study showed that the SIBD had a positive and significative impact on organiza-
tional processes linked to the management of alliance portfolios, proposing, therefore, 
the importance and the need for more active participation of the directors in strategic 
decisions, with the objective of ensuring holistic management that is more effective 
and more efficient. On the other hand, as proposed in the theoretical background to this 
study, Zahra and Pearce II (1989) pointed out that the impact of the boards of directors 
on the performance of the firm can occur, either directly, through a series of attributes of 
the boards of directors, or in an indirect way, through the functions and roles that they 
perform. Likewise, Heracleous (2001) affirmed that researchers should avoid models 
that establish a direct relation between the boards of directors and performance. On the 
contrary, he argued that the functions performed by these boards, in particular, their ac-
tive involvement in strategic decisions for the alliance portfolios, will impact on more 
efficient and effective management.
Conclusions
In conclusion, this study has helped to demystify the complex relationships between the 
strategic involvement of boards of directors and the results linked to the management 
of the alliance portfolio.
The main theoretical contribution of this investigative study is its arrival at a deeper 
understanding of the role that the boards of directors might have in terms of assessment 
and participation in strategic decisions at a corporate level, centring on the management 
of alliance portfolios. Thus, from the perspective of the function of service, the results 
demonstrate that one consequence of the active involvement of the board of directors in 
strategic decisions is further development of the capabilities of the firm, in this case of 
the alliance portfolio management capability, but active involvement has no direct effect 
on performance; this effect is produced through greater fulfilment of the capabilities of 
the organization. Moreover, this work has shown that there are a series of antecedent 
factors or variables that can facilitate or complicate the strategic involvement of the 
board of directors in the management of the alliances that constitute the portfolio.
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At an empirical level, the study has shown that the strategic involvement of the board of 
directors has a positive and significative influence on the different organizational process-
es linked to the management of alliance portfolios, thereby influencing the value of that 
portfolio. The practical implications of this study, both for managers and for directors, 
should contribute to reflection on the management of alliance portfolios. Accordingly, 
the literature has centred a lot on the supervisory role, but much less so on the consul-
tancy function or strategic function, where active participation in evaluating and manag-
ing strategic alliances as a whole may be decisive, in order to generate greater collabora-
tive synergies and, consequentially, to increase the value of the alliance portfolio. The 
results have confirmed the suggestions of Hoffmann (2005) on the necessary involve-
ment of boards of directors to carry out effective management of the alliance portfolio.
This research also presents a series of limitations, although each one could form the 
basis for future lines of research that would complement its principal findings. From an 
empirical perspective, a first limitation is that a sample of firms has been analysed from 
one particular country (Spain) and with specific characteristics (established MNCs), 
which could have certain drawbacks when generalizing and extrapolating any results. 
In second place, alliance portfolio management is a dynamic organizational process, 
however, we were unable to conduct a longitudinal analysis in this study. Performing 
a longitudinal study might therefore constitute an interesting line of future research. 
Finally, a series of factors impacts on the capability of the board to manage the alliance 
portfolio. In this work, we have analysed the involvement of boards of directors, but it 
would be interesting to introduce both other contextual variables with a view to gain-
ing a better understanding of this capability and its consequences and the moderating 
or mediating roles of other variables related to the attributes of the board of directors.
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